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Book Review
Ellis Katz and G. Alan Tarr, eds., Federalism and Rights. Lanham, Maryland:
University Press of America, 1995. Pp. xxiii + 208.
Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. Pp. vii + 474.
Reviewed by Candice Hoke
Until relatively recently, many legal academicians seemed to view advocacy
of a reinvigorated federalism as little more than a thinly disguised ploy for
revitalizing racism or other politically regressive governmental policies. However accurate this view may once have been, it now appears more legal scholars
are heeding the previously scarce voices who have been suggesting that the
achievement of critical instrumental process values rests in empowered and
valued state governments, and that federalism should not be forever tainted
by the odious causes in whose service it has sometimes been placed.'
Some legal scholars who previously would have confided that they found in
federalism cases and theory nothing worth deep reflection may have begun to
reconsider that judgment. The books reviewed here are complementary resources that will be useful to those resuming this academic and political
journey. Neither book, however, directly confronts the key operational questions that currently envelop political leaders and legal minds at both the
federal and state levels of government. These include, for instance, such
quandaries as which powers should be allocated to the states instead of the
federal government, and which held concurrently or by the federal government alone. What precise responsibilities should each level of government
have on which regulatory matters? And what types of "checking" powers
should each level of government have on the other's functions? Nor does
either book offer a comprehensive theory of American constitutional federalism that transcends the traditional dichotomous thought-paths endemic to

Candice Hoke is Associate Professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University.
1.

That is to say, a federal governmental structure permits a wide range of substantive policy
ends to be achieved under its umbrella, from regressive to progressive. Federalism writ large
as a political theory also coexists with a variety of ideological positions, including some that
are diametrically opposed to one another. In this aspect, federalism is similar to many other
theories. Natural law, for example, was invoked by ChiefJustice Taney tojustify Dred Scott and
yet was also appealed to by abolitionists. Martin Luther King relied on natural law for his civil
rights activities, yet Chief Justice Burger also called upon natural law to reject civil rights
claims in his concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick. Stanley Fish, among others, has argued that
no theory entails any single line of political consequences.
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this area. Instead, each focuses on one problematic that has traditionally
plagued discussions of federalism, and moves those debates forward.
Federalismand Rights
Does federalism-and especially those models by which subnational governments retaifi significant powers-promote or undermine individual rights?
These essays confront the obstacle that troubles contemporary American legal
scholars most persistently when evaluating any new calls for increased devolution of regulatory power. Notably, these essays do not merely rehearse the old
certainties that have plagued the debate within American legal circles but seek
to reconsider the problem using theoretical, comparative, and historical
perspectives. The anthology, sponsored by Daniel Elazar's Center for the
Study of Federalism at Temple University, presents a broad set of ideas that
help to transcend the traditional antinomies associated with discussions of
federalism. Five of the eleven contributors are lawyers, but only one, A. E. Dick
Howard, is currently a professor at a U.S. law school. The others include
several American political scientists, a state appellate judge, a Canadian law
professor, and a European Communityjudge.
Elazar's lead essay, "Federalism, Diversity and Rights," establishes the anthology as a leading resource for contemporary federalism studies. An eminent political scientist, Elazar argues that modern democratic government
rests upon "three pillars," namely "federalism, the protection of individual
rights, and the idea of civil society" (page 1). He suggests that democracy is
possible only if a nation seeks to combine and protect all three of these
commitments. Elazar thus seeks to demonstrate certain inherent interconnections between robust federalism and vigorous rights protection-and to refute
their disjunction. To do so, he elaborates a vision of federalism that draws its
inspiration from civic republicanism.
"Federal democracy," Elazar offers, "is constitutionalized partnership and
power sharing on a non-centralized basis through discussion and deliberation" (2). It does not aim for rule by simple majority, but rather seeks "to
create a balancing of interests, voices and diversity in such a way that there is
no permanent majority." Individuals, Elazar notes, cannot be reduced to
having merely one interest, but should be recognized as belonging to shifting,
divergent majorities and minority coalitions depending on the particular issue
and the moment in time. Federalism's "constituent institutions... together
share power ... in a multicentered or noncentralized way" (2) and thus better
permit each citizen to exercise some power and influence over some government policy.
Thus, Elazar contends, federalism must be recognized as a "form of democratic republicanism" that is capable of"accommodat[ing] the diversity inherent in a democracy." By contrast, the French Jacobin error lay not only in
preferring simple majorities but also in organizing the state as a "power
pyramid," with those occupying the top deciding "who or what is on top" and
who sinks to the bottom. The pyramid model, Elazar observes, often situates
the people of a state "notjust on the bottom.., but really underneath it" (2).
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Parliamentary democracy commits an analogous error, he suggests, because
power is concentrated in the elite center and all others are cast into the
periphery. Of governmental structures, federal democracy alone entrusts the
people themselves with real political power-one primary individual right.
The centrality of this principle-whether the government vests citizens
with real, as opposed to merely theoretical, political power-is underscored
by Elazar's contention that it should function as the criterion by which to
determine whether a government is truly a federal democracy or merely a
pretender.
Elazar's essay is also noteworthy for linking federalism and individual rights
with what he identifies as the third primary goal and constituent mechanism
of modern democracy, that of achieving a civil society. Here, Elazar extends
Adam B. Seligman's work 2 and contrasts a federal democracy with totalistic
governments: "The idea of a civil society holds that every political-social order
has to have both governmental and private spheres and that government does
not have the authority to intervene in every aspect of the social order" (3). It is
constituted by associations and individuals, and establishes governmental
institutions by the consent of the governed. Elazar emphasizes that unless
governmental power is limited from controlling the private sphere, the conclusion is a totalistic, if not totalitarian, state. Civil society, then, is necessarily
composed of interdependent forces: government functions as a "framing
institution" (5) within which private, public nongovernmental, and governmental activities can thrive.
Elazar does not glibly pass over the claims for other group and individual
rights to be recognized and protected. But hejoins those who caution against
encouraging persons to identify themselves primarily according to the "primordial ties" of ethnic and religious communities. He reasons that these ties
tend to foment the most bloody and intractable conflicts, ones that are
capable of razing civil society. Despite some obvious glaring discontinuities,
he suggests, in this nation "federalism and rights have not been in tension but
have actually complemented each other in the development of a more successful, a more democratic, a more peaceful, a more just, and a more progressive civil society" (7). As evidence for his proposition, we might note that the
abolitionist and then civil rights and women's movements of the past 150 years
all began as private associations of citizens in smaller communities, who later
successfully forged them into national movements. Federalism theory contends that citizens are more likely to consider themselves politically empowered, and to undertake activities designed to force political change, if they
have both subnational governmental units, and vigorous private and nongovernmental associations, on which and through which local citizens can focus
their energies for change.
We should recognize, Elazar says, that political progress toward humane
ends will more likely be continued if we strengthen a sense of responsibility to
the communities of which one is a part, and not just a sense of individual
rights. Here, of course, Elazar weaves some important threads from commu2.

See The Idea of Civil Society (NewYork, 1992).
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nitarian writers and civic republican theorists, and can be understood as
advocating a concept of situated rights. This conception argues that rights
arise from and are dependent upon the health and vitality of the civil society
in which one lives, rather than simply inhering in human beings. It thereby
entails recognition that individual rights are vulnerable to political vicissitudes; those who value rights highly among human goods should exercise
great care in maintaining the civil society in which rights may be respected
and receive robust protection. In other words, social vigilance and political
involvement are needed, not simply "rights talk."
Some of these themes are echoed in other essays, but a number of authors
plow significantly different ground. Dick Howard's essay-"Does Federalism
Secure or Undermine Rights?"-reviews the historical arguments raised both
for and against federalism. He develops the downside potential of federalist
governments, noting the "tyranny of small places" (21), the problematic
justification for varying individual rights as between subnational units, and the
practical difficulties that flow from the absence of uniform law governing the
nation. But when the right of self-government is recognized as one key
individual right, Howard argues, the balance of the argument shifts sharply in
the federalist direction. Local autonomy can promote the recognition and
protection of rights, rather than tyrannical majority rule, and power concentrated in a centralized government can lead to tyrannical hostility to individual rights. Howard concludes that the benefits of a federal structure of
government far outweigh its risks, and he underscores the substantial risks to
individual rights of having a unitary, centralized government.
Those interested in philosophical treatments of rights will find GaryJeffrey
Jacobsohn's extended article especially worthwhile.Jacobsohn, a professor of
political science at Williams College, has evaluated the work of prominent
constitutional rights theorists including Michael Perry, Ronald Dworkin, and
Robert Bork, focusing on their conception of the relation between individual
rights (both their creation and their protection) and federalism. He contends
that within virtually the entire spectrum of modern constitutional theoryincluding even those who have advocated enhanced subnational governmental power-runs a "a predominant, almost pervasive, inhospitability to the
idea of federalism" (30). He traces this hostility to "a philosophically driven
compulsion for a uniformity of rights on the one hand, and a desire to respect
the integrity of diverse group experiences on the other" (31). Viewed through
these lenses, the diversity of the types and vigor of rights protection permitted
by our federalism appears obsolete and regressive. This conclusion has, in
turn, obstructed development of a more sophisticated understanding of the
integral role subnational governments can play (and have historically played)
in the creation of new rights.
Jacobsohn locates strains of contemporary antifederalism (as opposed to
the historical anti-Federalists, who, in today's vernacular, would be federalists)
running through an extremely wide range of constitutional theorists, including, perhaps most surprisingly, even some civic republican and communitarian
writers. The analysis he presents suggests that constitutional theorists' dismissal of any perduring values from federalism is not historically based, but is
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rooted deeply in theirjurisprudential commitments to rights universalism. If
Jacobsohn is correct, the problem for federalism proponents is one of developing not simply a broader and more accurate historical understanding of the
relationship between federalism and rights, but also a defensible jurisprudential model of rights that coexists with the diversity of legal policies encouraged
by federal democracy. Only after this jurisprudential task is completed,
Jacobsohn suggests, can the reflexive posture against federalism be effectively
transcended.
Though this review has focused on the theoretical discussions of federalism
gathered into the book's first unit, the other two parts offer worthy contributions for legal scholars. The second unit, Federalism and Rights in the United
States, begins with a pair of articles byJean Yarbrough and Michael P. Zuckert
that take decidedly opposed positions on the conception of rights underlying
the framers' Constitution, and on whether states were conceived as mechanisms for protecting rights or more feared as threats to rights. The authors
also disagree on the extent the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
nationalize and universalize rights protection, and the extent the Reconstruction amendments more generally reallocated powers between state and nation. A third essay in this group, by a state courtjudge, Dorothy Toth Beasley,
inventories the enhanced protections for rights that flow from our federal
system, and contends dual protections are far superior to those offered by a
unitary system. Talbot D 'Alemberte ends the unit, offering a series of concrete
proposals by which state governments, and particularly state judiciaries, can
be strengthened in the rights-enhancing role outlined by justice Brennan.
The book's last unit is dedicated to exploring comparative perspectives on
federalism. Here its offerings are few but noteworthy. One essay, by Koen
Lenaerts, a European Community judge and Belgian law professor, surveys
the growth in meaningful individual rights at the federal level, and mechanisms for protections of rights, since the Community came into existence. He
perceives a synergistic relationship between enhanced rights enforcement via
private party litigation and augmented Community judicial powers over the
conduct of individual states. The European Community's experience thus far
parallels that of the United States with regard to modem enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Canada's recent constitutional experiments are explored in the final comparative article. At base, Irwin Coder's essay-"Can the Center Hold? Federalism and Rights in Canada"-sounds a warning to other nations that might
seek to provide exceptional autonomy to certain ethnic groups. Although he
does not offer concrete proposals by which the crisis could have been avoided,
Coder cautions that instead of safeguarding diversity and pluralism at the
national level, the singling out of certain groups such as the Quebecois and
aboriginal peoples fomented more aggressive centrifugal forces that threaten
the very existence of the nation and, thus, all other rights.
To Make a Nation
Samuel Beer has written a lively, opinionated intellectual history of the
American approach to republican government. He seeks to demonstrate the

HeinOnline -- 47 J. Legal Educ. 153 1997

JournalofLegal Education
invalidity of Martin Diamond's conclusion that "the federalism of the framers,
far from having a coherent rationale, combined two incompatible forms, one
state-centered, the other nation-centered." Beer disputes Diamond's observation that, during the founding, the people "could not decide whether they
were one community or many" (xi). Rather, he contends that the Constitution
proceeds from a coherent logic, what Beer terms "national federalism" (137),
which better preserves the people's sovereignty and rights than a unitary
government (307). 3 Beer submits that the internal logic of the American
federal system did not emerge by accident of political compromise in 1787 but
was forged in the debate spanning 800 years of primarily European philosophical discourse, with which our framers were well acquainted. He vividly
recounts the clash of the great ideas concerning the proper relationship
between the individual and the government that culminates in the American
Constitution.
Beer's theory of American constitutional federalism is thus not based on
historical analysis of the Constitutional Convention, the Reconstruction amendments, or the post-New Deal period, nor on a legal or conceptual analysis of
the Constitution's. allocation of powers between the two primary levels of
government. He finds most apposite the conflict of ideas beginning with
Aquinas and ending with The Federalist.He admirably stresses the relationship
between federalism structures and an empowered, represented people in
whom ultimate sovereignty is vested. In so doing, he undermines the validity
of any view that federalism should be equated with the favoring of authoritarian governmental structures and policies.
The deficiencies of Beer's study are substantial, however, even recognizing
the constraints imposed by the discipline of intellectual history. Chiefly they
revolve around Beer's inability to transcend the dichotomy he perceives. The
antinomies Beer surveys in his Introduction and Conclusion, which prompted
the study, are familiar: national theory versus compact theory; Hamilton
versusJefferson; federal power versus "states' rights"; civil rights policies versus
racism and regressive postures; FDR and Lincoln versusJefferson Davis; Lyndon
Johnson's vision of America versus Ronald Reagan's. Beer clearly identifies
those advocating enhanced national power as the ones in the white hats.
Those concerned with strengthening state or local governmental power, from
the founding period through today, are just as clearly the bad guys. A close
reading also reveals Beer's conviction that the latter are out of step with the
Hegelian spirit of history and fall to recognize that human progress is ineluctably on the side of those advocating more nationalist positions. While the book
does offer some arguments aimed at transcending the dichotomy between
these camps, in other places Beer rehearses the antinomies of the reflexive old
faith with such vigor that the book's contribution to current discourse is

3.

The explication and justification of Beer's conception of "national federalism" span the
entire work. A few elements are worth noting here. Popular sovereignty led to the creation of
a national republic via the Constitution. Territorial allocation of certain powers to states, with
retention of other powers centrally, was achieved by the Constitution. The allocations of
power are superintended nationally for national purposes (e.g., 137, 215-17, 379-92).
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limited. In many ways, Beer's book epitomizes the historic quandary but fails
to transcend it.
Beer's choice to return to Aquinas as the baseline for reconstructing the
intellectual history of American federalism may be somewhat surprising, for
Aquinas articulated the theoretical rationale for obedience to monarchy.
According to Aquinas, the cosmos was created and ordered into a hierarchical
system within which subordinates owed, as a matter of divine providence,
obedience (31-32). Inequality formed an essential aspect to the divine plan:
social and natural order "can mean only the ranking of things on a scale of
inequality" (34). Beer suggests that the Thomistic world envisioned "a kind of
federalism from the top" whereby the chief ruler is constrained in some
respects by the ultimate (divine) power, but otherwise "creates a sphere of
autonomy for the subordinate and for the community that he rules" (49).
Within this hierarchical tradition, both the secular and ecclesiastical governments ruled by the consent of the governed, but that "consent" derived from
deference to authority, not freely chosen self-government. Thus "the task of
republicanism was to convert the passive consent of deference into the active
consent of self-government" (64).
The break with the authoritarian tradition, Beer asserts, owes significantly
to the foundation laid byJohn Milton. Milton advocated liberty of conscience,
notjust for the hierarchically empowered but for all persons (72-73). Because
each person can participate in the discovery of the truth, the individual should
concomitantly play a role in deciding what is the common good. Deference to
authority interferes with the open discussion and rational deliberation by
which persons test and correct their tentative concluisions. The state should
have the benefit of these open discussions, Milton contended, because "a
wider spectrum of opinion can increase the chances of public judgment's
reaching new and broader truth" (76).
After developing this baseline via Aquinas and Milton, and with some
intermittent attention to actual historical events resulting in the republican
revolutions of the eighteenth century, Beer devotes roughly one chapter
apiece to select figures who intellectually advanced the understanding of
national federalism. He extolsJames Harrington's proposed structure for the
national republic, criticizes Montesquieu's confederate republic, and locates
the Hegelian transcendence in Madison's "compound republic."
Those familiar with the shifts over time in Madison's commitments to
nationalism versus empowered subnational governmonts will find Beer's treatment of Madison frustrating. Beer does not even advert to the dramatic
change from Madison's youthful exuberant trust in an empowered national
government that would protect individual rights-his position when writing as
Publius-to his disdain of this position barely a decade later. The Federalists'
prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts led Madison to be deeply
suspicious of unchecked national power, and moved him to advocate vigorous
dual protections of rights. This experience also led Madison, in later life, to
become far more Jeffersonian than Hamiltonian in his approach to federalism as a theory and operational structure. Beer's characterization of Madison
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as an unabashed centralizer and his treatment of Madison as though his
thinking ended with The Federalist raise questions about the accuracy and
fairness of his treatment of the other key figures he analyzes. In short, Beer's
history too often displays a Hegelian determinist drive toward the predetermined end of Beer's theory of national federalism.
Now that renewed political and legal attention has been focused on federalism, more resources dedicated to exploring its persistent questions will likely
become available. Beer's To Make a Nation deiineates the theoretical antecedents ofAmerican constitutionalism from Aquinas to Publius, and more specifically advocates a particular conception of national republican government.
Federalism and Rights surmounts the platitudes and antinomies that tend to
characterize federalism discussions, providing diverse and sophisticated insights into the question whether federal governmental structures tend to
promote or retard individual rights. Both books, speaking in decidedly different voices and relying on different disciplines, form. complements for
probing the origins and nature of the best structure of government that will
respect humanity.
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